JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. In scholarly literature, too, it is embedded as the most characteristic expression of black South African Empire sentiment, the specific consolatory tradition of an infant social elite, lubricated by dictionary English and mission Christianity, with a sure grasp of the gulf between "civilized" and "barbaric" or "respectable" and "raw," and a continuing need to draw on the fag-end of a liberal imperialism.
Within a context of modernizing ideals and an ambience of political moderation, one response of African pro-Empire loyalism was an infiltrationist kind of mortgaged anticolonialism. In the early 1900s, the best of the "civilized men"-schoolmasters, lawyers, clergymen, journalists, traders, and progressive peasants-puckered up to the best of the sympathetic liberal imperial establishment. Its drawing rooms included the British prime minister, David Lloyd muscle might yet stay the hand of an increasingly rapacious settler rule. Neil Parsons has provided one striking illustration of this in the case of the Tswana chiefs who traveled to Britain in the 1890s, insisting on the maintenance of direct British "protection" in Bechuanaland, a security that would be dashed by British South Africa Company rule.6 Another prominent example would be the 1913 Natives' Land Act in South Africa, in response to which the African political elite mounted a mission to London in 1914 to press doggedly for liberal British intervention to turn things around by using reserve imperial powers to block racially discriminatory Union legislation.7 For at least a decade after Union and its creation of the first "New" South Africa (and arguably, for even longer),8 Britain was still morally a landlord, if of a neglectfully absentee kind, part of an almost ritualistic counter-theater of rights and civilized progress.9 Certainly, there can be little doubt about the weight of this pro-British consensus among the black elite. In scholarly literature, too, it is embedded as the most characteristic expression of black South African Empire sentiment, the specific consolatory tradition of an infant social elite, lubricated by dictionary English and mission Christianity, with a sure grasp of the gulf between "civilized" and "barbaric" or "respectable" and "raw," and a continuing need to draw on the fag-end of a liberal imperialism.
A place to look for another level of alliance or affinity with a British interest is the domain of wars of Empire, and its mobilization of the minds and bodies of thousands of black Cape subjects. Here we might be able to glimpse something of deeply felt instincts and convictions that were more immediate, perhaps less driven by sentiment or public artifice, and rooted in wider cultural solidarities and an umbrella consciousness. As the costly South African War got underway, large numbers of ordinary, "freeborn" African and Coloured inhabitants who became caught up in the war effort drew on a fairly robust sense of citizenship of a Cape that was unambiguously British country, Crown territory to be defended against the menacing incursions of an alien Boer Republican "native law" or a rigid "Boer creed" of no legal equality.'l Such impulses of local duty towards the need of Empire in crisis applied, first, to those with a traditional anchorage in Cape Victorian virtues of "respectability" and "self-help," organized urban smallholders and peasant "big men" who busied themselves with voluntary welfare and other activities to bolster the British cause, or otherwise threw themselves into patriotic agitation.1" By 1900, African Vigilance Committees and Coloured War Councils in towns like Port Elizabeth, East London, Graaff-Reinet, and Worcester were advancing subscription funds and food donations exclusively to the British Army; ungraciously, if not rudely, the chocolate and biscuits run was not extended to colonial settler militia garrisons. As a Coloured printer from Wellington reminded his beavering associates in surrounding small rural towns, "our proud sacrifice of goods and labour is for those who have come here as our English brothers, not for these rough European guardsmen of uncertain character, some we are told are even Lebanese."12 Writing a private letter after his public collection of comfort goods for an arriving British infantry column in Kimberley in 1901, Arthur Hendrickse declared I will never stand by with an empty pocket when I see such men, who set an example with their lives. Our country is as theirs, its English soil be numbered among the things of value we hold most dear.... What is it with all its riches, if it not be freed from every vestige of the despoiling Boers. These men who are here will fight on so that I who have children growing up will know they stand under their English Government.13
Examples of such heartfelt avowals of Cape British patriotism could be multiplied for these colonial war years; their writers, like the Coloured clerk, Hendrickse, were not necessarily producing something rousing for public consumption. Nor were they crafting through a romantic mist of myth and meaning about Cape colonial experience of the crisis of 1899-1902. They, were, for the most part, reflecting the immediacy of instinct and belief. And the overall message they sent out was one that assumed a primary moral unity with a national British effort, beyond the horizon of the dynamics of local settler state mobilization. In that respect, the South African War crisis could be said to have reactivated, if not regenerated, the underlying values and influential pull of a British African and Coloured elites who called upon men to be patriotic and to undertake military duties in the Great War in the belief that it offered an opportunity to prove their mettle as Crown subjects and to strengthen the legitimacy of their claim upon greater rights, may in a way have been compensating for their own marginality and frustration through rhetorical excess. Equally, belief in the progressive capacity and influence of Empire did not blind observers to obvious inequalities and injustices in Union service conditions. Questions were raised about the well-being of the 25,000 or so Cape Corps infantrymen deployed in East Africa and France, claiming that they were being subjected to undue stress and were suffering fatigue because of their load, and that they were being incompetently officered by whites, "some of these even being, to all intents, no more than Dutch South Africans."24 As for the South African Native Labour Contingent, to which members of the educated Cape African elite, including those of the South African Native National Congress, lent their early support as a "great experiment,"25 it did not take long for grumbling to break out. Eastern Cape correspondents aired discontents over various petty segregatory measures, the imposition of labor discipline by Union Defence Force officers who had been contaminated by the habits of their Native Affairs service background, the brooding and meddlesome organizational presence of Native Affairs Department officials, and the pinching humiliation of accommodating Labour Corps Battalions in France in tightly controlled closed compounds.26
Of equal significance was the apportioning of blame for onerous and discriminatory terms of service and, in the case of the South African Native Labour Contingent, the tepid response to the 1916-17 recruiting campaign for noncombatant laboring servicemen. As Brian Willan first noted over two decades ago, the fortunes of the mobilization effort were affected adversely "by the fact of its direct association with the South African authorities," even though "technically they were acting on behalf of the Imperial government." Popular feeling towards the scheme "was inevitably coloured by the deeply felt distrust that was attached Probably the most obvious is that a pugnacious Cape "Englandism" was assuredly not created by these war episodes: warfare stoked embers that were already warm. Finally, we should never overlook the fact that the imperial order gave a body of Cape citizens rights and immunities not bequeathed to their counterparts in other regions of South Africa; many of those who took part in these two large wars considered themselves the inheritors of an earlier nineteenth-century emancipation, one engineered by an anti-slavery Britain. Solomon Ramanana, an educated small hauler from Somerset East and marked locally as a "native of astute mind," was sufficiently steeped in Cape "tradition" to know all too well that settler voices of racial mastery did not all sound alike. Bringing his own gun with him to the Somerset East town guard, he was more than up for a fight so that he "would not be living under being bossed about." Ramanana knew the distinction between the respectful deference of calling local English-speaking farmers seer ("sir"), and the scraping servility of his finding himself having to address newly installed Boer invaders as baas ("boss").53 He was a subject, but also a citizen. One view of historical hindsight suggests that we smile at the credulousness of kholwa Africans, the 50 or 75 pounds a year men like Ramanana.54 Another, however, is to say that in fact they deserve to be taken seriously. In the strength of their defensive will to fight and later willingness to serve beyond their frontiers, they exhibited high levels of Cape "imperial English" patriotism and xenophobic prejudices. Alongside this, in defense of their own sense of identity, they displayed purposeful solidarities as well, gearing themselves effectively to take a stand behind a bastion of colonial intellect.
